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ABSTRACT In the analysis of coordinated network attacks on electric power cyber-physical system (CPS), 
it is difficult to restore the complete attack path, and the intent of the attack cannot be identified 
automatically. A method is therefore proposed for the extracting patterns of coordinated network attacks on 
electric power CPS based on temporal-topological correlation. First, the attack events are aggregated 
according to the alarm log of the cyber space, and a temporal-causal Bayesian network-based cyber attack 
recognition algorithm is proposed to parse out the cyber attack sequences of the same attacker. Then, 
according to the characteristic curves of different attack measurement data in physical space, a combination 
of physical attack event criteria algorithm is designed to distinguish the types of physical attack events. 
Finally, physical attack events and cyber attack sequences are matched via temporal-topological correlation, 
frequent patterns of attack sequences are extracted, and hidden multi-step attack patterns are found from 
scattered grid measurement data and information from alarm logs. The effectiveness and efficiency of the 
proposed method are verified by the testbed at Mississippi State University. 
INDEX TERMS Cyber-physical system, Attack pattern, Temporal-topological Correlation, Fuzzy feature 
Analysis, Frequent pattern tree. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “Ukrainian Blackout” in 2015, a landmark event in 
history in which a cyber attack was made on a power grid, 
fully confirms that cyber attack could cripple essential 
public systems. The SANS ICS information security 
organization has clearly stated that the cause of the incident 
was a coordinated network attack [1]. A coordinated attack 
can also look as though multiple attackers are working 
together to execute a distributed scan on many internal 
addresses or services. It is believed that probes of this 
nature have been developed in an attempt to elude the scan 
detection code present in many intrusion detection systems 
[2]. The destructiveness of coordinated network attacks is 
increasing with the widespread application of a large 
number of smart terminals and advanced measurement 
devices in smart grids [3]. 
In traditional information security technology, the 
intrusion process of the physical system is not considered, 
and it is difficult to effectively identify potential physical 
attack behavior [4]. Additionally, due to the combination of 
both cyber and physical attacks, the existing protection 
methods, such as intrusion detection system (IDS), firewalls, 
and abnormal data detection, lack effective correlation 
capabilities and cannot identify multi-step coordinated 
network attacks [5]. Therefore, there is an urgent need to 
study how to extract hidden multi-step attack patterns to 
reveal the complete process of intrusion behavior via the 
integration of physical grid operation information and cyber 
system alarm information. 
Many scholars have carried out research on the pattern 
recognition and mining of coordinated network attack 
sequences. A mining algorithm for cascading failure model 
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based on sequential pattern mining has been proposed by 
Trang et al. [6], in which the simulation analysis of a 
massive amount of grid operation data is conducted to 
effectively identify the system’s cascading failure modes. A 
sequential pattern mining method that takes into account 
the degree of interest of sequential patterns and the utility 
value of each item in the sequence was proposed by Li Y et 
al. [7-8]. It presents an improvement over traditional 
sequential pattern mining, and uses sequence frequency as 
an important measure for patterns. A multi-stage 
coordinated attack analysis model based on the finite state 
machine and intelligent planning technology, which can 
identify the steps and paths of an attack, was established in 
the work by Gan w et al. [9-11]. The reference [12-13] 
showed how a previously published method based on 
Monte Carlo simulation could be enhanced to take into 
account time-dependent phenomena. The reference [14-16] 
studied transmission vulnerability based on the fault chain 
theory of security science, the cascading failure process and 
its generic features was described according to a fault chain. 
The reference [17] findings highlight the need to consider 
the load and coupling preference when designing robust 
interdependent networks. 
However, the existing methods and models have some 
limitations. (1) In the analysis of the attack process, only 
the pattern analysis of the cyber network space or the 
physical grid space is performed; this diminishes the 
integrity of the cyber-physical attack process. (2) 
Supervised learning based on finite state machines and 
intelligent planning focuses on the attack state transition 
analysis of smaller-scale systems, which requires too much 
prior knowledge and complex rules. It is not practical for 
application in large-scale CPS systems. (3) The existing 
mining models of attack patterns do not comprehensively 
consider the impacts of physical grid constraints and cyber 
network attacks on electric power CPS systems, and there 
remains a lack of effective methods for identifying attack 
events. 
Based on the existing research, the main purpose of this 
paper is to mine frequent attack patterns consisting of cyber 
attack sequences and physical attack events, and then to 
restore the attacker's attack process on the entire electric 
power CPS system. In summary, the contributions of this 
paper are as follows. 
1) The fuzzy C-means and temporal causal Bayesian 
network are introduced to aggregate cyber system alarm 
information and extract cyber attack sequences, which 
significantly reduces the proportion of alarms. Multi-step 
attack sequences are obtained via credibility calculation, 
which improves the accuracy and the number of identified 
multi-step attack sequences. 
2) A new physical attack event recognition method that 
combines physical criteria conditions with rule criteria 
conditions is proposed, and considers the variation law of 
the characteristic curves for power grid measurement data 
under different attacks. Additionally, three new key 
indicators are defined to improve the random forest (RF). 
Finally, the identification accuracy of physical attack events 
is improved. 
3) For the first time, the temporal and topological 
relationship of cyber-physical components is introduced 
into frequent pattern mining, which combines cyber attack 
sequences and physical attack events. The frequent 
subsequence in the complete attack sequence can be 
extracted, which is the coordinated network attack pattern. 
This method effectively reduces the number of candidate 
sequences to be scanned, and no prior knowledge is 
required to set rules manually, which improves the 
efficiency of pattern mining. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, related definitions of coordinated network 
attacks and the attack process problem formulation are 
given. The extraction method of coordinated network attack 
patterns is presented in Section III. The validation and 
performance of the proposed method are analyzed in 
Section IV. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V. 
II. RELATED DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM 
FORMULATION 
A. RELATED DEFINITIONS OF COORDINATED 
NETWORK ATTACKS 
Coordinated network attacks on electric power CPS include 
two processes that occur in different spaces [18]. In the 
cyber system space, attacks will generate a large number of 
discrete alarm sequences; in the power system space, attack 
events will cause continuous changes in measurement data. 
Moreover, there is an attack conversion relationship 
between cyber attacks and physical grid attacks, and there 
are certain attack patterns of specific attack steps. Therefore, 
the relevant concepts of the process of coordinated network 
attacks are defined as follows.  
Definition 1. Cyber attack sequence (CAS). CAS aim at 
attacking the cyber components in electric power CPS 
systems, which include routers, switches, computing devices, 
etc. The same attacker aims to obtain certain cyber system 
permissions, and implements a complete multi-step attack to 
trigger an alarm event sequence, which is defined as CAS. 
CAS = [s
CE1 
1 > s
CE2 
2 >...> s
CEm 
m ], where s
CEi 
k  (1 ≤ k ≤ m) indicates 
an alarm event, which is represented by a 7-tuple [19], s
CEi 
k = 
(cid, time, src-ip, dst-ip, src-port, dst-port, sig_name), the 
superscript CEi indicates the number of cyber components, 
and the subscript k is the type number of the cyber attack 
event, and the related event sequence is ordered in 
chronological order such that si.time ≤ sj.time, (1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ m). 
Definition 2. Physical attack event (PAE). PAE aim at 
attacking physical components, such as relay protection 
devices, breaks, transmission lines, etc. Attacks that 
influence or damage the operation status of the power grid 
by tampering with measurement data or physical device 
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configuration parameters are defined as PAE = [e
PE1 
1 |e
PE2 
2
|...,|e
PEn 
n ], where the superscript PEi indicates the number of 
physical components, and subscript k is the type of physical 
attack event. e
PEn 
k  (1 < k < n) will cause abnormal changes 
in grid measurement (e.g., the voltage and current phase 
angle, amplitude, impedance, etc.).  While PAE satisfies 
e1∩em = Ø, (0 < l, m < n), only single physical attack event 
behavior is considered in this paper, and multi-step physical 
attack events are not analyzed. 
Definition 3. Attack Pattern (AP): A CAS and PAE that 
belong to the same combined attack sequence [s
CE1 
1  > s
CE2 
2 ...> s
CEm 
m > e
PEn 
n ] represent the complete attack path sequence. The 
attack process is closely related to the topological structure of 
the physical power grid and the information network. 
Therefore, under a specific electric power CPS topological 
structure, although the attack paths are different, there is an 
implicit correlation between these paths. The most frequently 
occurring subsequence in the attack path sequence are 
defined as AP , which is expressed as [s
CEj 
j > s
CEj+1 
j+1 > …>s
CEj+i 
j+i => 
e
PEk 
k ], (1 ≤ j+i ≤ m, 1≤ k≤n). 
B. ANALYSIS OF COORDINATED NETWORK ATTACK 
PROCESS 
The complete coordinated network attack process includes 
two phases, namely a cyber attack and physical attack, as 
illustrated in Fig. 1. During the cyber attack phase, cyber 
components are primarily attacked through network 
intrusion means to obtain certain control rights, such as via 
vulnerability scanning, brute-force attack, and network 
monitoring [20-22]. Based on this, during the physical 
attack phase, via the injection of false data or other means 
of tampering with the scheduling control instructions or 
attacking the physical system components, such attack 
behavior will cause the power system to fail or the line load 
to be reduced, thereby disrupting the normal operation of 
the power grid [23-25]. 
 
FIGURE 1. Coordinated network attack process. 
 
Coordinated network attacks begin with the cyber attack, 
move through the security boundary of the cyber system 
and the physical system, and finally acts on the physical 
power grid [26]. It generally consists of multiple 
interrelated attack steps, the former step of which is often 
the condition for the latter step to occur [27].  
Based on the above analysis of the main characteristics 
of coordinated network attacks, there are two kinds of 
relationships in the different attack stages. 
1) Temporal relationship: If the premise of an attack on 
the physical grid is to obtain certain permissions, then the 
cyber attack that obtains this permission must happen first. 
In other words, to achieve a specific attack target, a cyber 
attack must be successfully carried out before the 
subsequent physical power grid attack, so the process 
determines the time range of the physical attack. 
Suppose an attacker's attack path contains parts CASi and 
PAEj, which separately occur in the periods [ti, ti+n] and [tj, 
tj+n]. If CASi is a prerequisite for PAEj, then CASi must 
happen before PAEj, that is, [ti, ti+n] < [tj, tj+n].
 2) Topological relationship: There is a topological 
relationship in the attack location. In a smart grid, cyber 
components (CE) and physical components (PE) are 
connected according to a certain topological structure. 
Therefore, the locations of attacked CE determine the area 
that may be physically attacked. It is assumed that the 
physical system is an n-node power system, and the cyber 
system is an m-node communication and control network. 
The two networks represent the connection relationship 
through a ternary mapping table O < CEs, PEs, R >, that is 
CEs represents a collection of CE in a cyber-network, PEs 
represents a collection of PE in a physical-network, and R 
represents the connection relationship between cyber-
physical components. If PEi is connected to CE (CE1, 
CE2 ,…,CEn), then there is a correlation between the cyber 
attack event sequence [s
CE1 
1 > s
CE2 
2 >…s
CEn 
n ] and the physical 
attack event e
PEi 
i . 
Assumptions 
1) Because the dispatch data network uses a standard 
communication protocol, there is a possibility of being 
hacked. 
2) After gaining the dispatcher's authority through attack 
methods such as permission elevation, the attacker can 
issue malicious load shedding instructions, leading to 
various types of grid accidents. 
3) Cyber and physical attacks occur within a certain 
interval. When the interval exceeds a certain time limit, the 
attack components completed earlier may lose their 
influence on subsequent attacks due to human recovery or 
security early warning. 
III.  EXTRACTION METHOD OF COORDINATED 
NETWORK ATTACK PATTERNS 
A. OVERALL FRAMEWORK 
The proposed framework for the extraction of coordinated 
network attack patterns is shown in Fig. 2. It consists of 
Cyber Network
Physical Network
Data 
injection 
Attack
Network topology
Cyber components 
Attack
Physical components 
Attack
Network coordinated 
Attack
T1
T2
T3
T4
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three main stages: the CAS recognition in the cyber 
system, the PAE recognition in the physical grid, and the 
AP extraction based on the temporal-topological 
correlation. The specific steps are as follows. 
 
PMU measurement data of 
power physical system
CASi∪PAEj   topological relationship connection 
O < CEs, PEs, R >
Attacker's full attack path CASi => PAEj 
based on temporal correlation winterval
Physical features criteria
Normal state 
data
Abnormal state data
Three new key indicators
（ηU and ηI,δI and δU,Г） 
PAE  recognition
Various alarm events of the  
cyber system
Aggregation of similar cyber 
attack events
Fuzzy causality analysis of attack 
sequence sets
CAS  recognition 
The 
analysis 
of 
physical 
system 
space 
attack
PAECAS
Decision rule 
criteria
Improved frequent pattern tree combining cyber-physical 
component numbers
Extraction result of AP
Pattern 
Extraction 
of 
coordinated
network  
attack
The 
analysis
of cyber 
system 
space 
attack
Y
N
 
 
FIGURE 2. Framework of the attack pattern extraction method. 
 
1) During the analysis phase of the attack process on the 
cyber system space, alarm events in the cyber system, such 
as the IDS, syslog, firewall log, and router log, is 
comprehensively used. According to the characteristics of 
cyber attack, the fuzzy c-means method is used to cluster 
the alarm events, therefore similar alarm events are 
aggregated together. Then, a temporal causal Bayesian 
network is used to perform a fuzzy causal analysis on the 
sequence set to construct a CAS set. Via credibility 
calculation, the CAS that belongs to the same attacker with 
the highest probability is recognized. 
2) During the analysis phase of the attack process on the 
physical system space, the measurement data collected by 
the power management unit (PMU) is obtained. Physical 
feature criteria conditions are established based on the 
operating characteristic curves under different attacks of the 
physical power grid, and the normal state and abnormal 
state of the physical system are preliminarily judged. Then, 
three key indicators (δI and δU represent the phase 
difference change rate of voltage or current, δI and δU 
represent the amplitude fluctuation rate of voltage or 
current ,   represents the mutation coefficient of the 
negative/zero sequence) are defined to represent the law of 
attack behavior. The specific attack type decision rule 
criterion for the abnormal state dataset is established based 
on the improved RF algorithm, and the PAE is recognized 
by relying on the above rules. 
3) During the extraction phase of the coordinated attack 
pattern, CASi∪PAEj are connected based on the temporal-
topological correlation. A dynamic sliding window winterval 
is then designed according to the temporal relationship to 
obtain the full attack path of the attacker. A coordinated 
network attack sequential pattern mining algorithm is 
proposed based on frequent pattern tree. According to the 
attack pattern threshold   and  , all coordinated network 
attack APs are extracted. 
B. CAS RECOGNITION BASED ON FUZZY FEATURE 
ANALYSIS 
1) CYBER ATTACK EVENT AGGREGATION 
When an attacker launches an attack on a power 
information network, a large number of warning traces will 
be left in the cyber components, including the IDS, router, 
and firewall. Considering that the alarm events s1, s2, ..., sk 
of multi-step cyber attack activities have a certain internal 
relationship in time and space, it can restore the steps and 
purpose of the attacker. However, these alarm logs are 
scattered throughout different cyber components, most of 
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them are low-level isolated events that lack relevance and 
have high false positive and false negative rates; therefore, 
traditional attack methods cannot be used to directly divide 
attack sequences. 
For this reason, the idea of fuzzy cluster analysis is 
adopted, and a fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm that 
takes into account the characteristics of cyber attacks based 
on the characteristics of the attacked cyber components is 
proposed. 
Let uik represent the attack activity xi belong to the 
membership degree of alarm event sk; 0 ≤ uik ≤ 1, and 
1
1
n
ik
i
u
=
=  . The objective function is then defined as 
follows [28]. 
2
1 1
( , )
n c
m
ik ik
k i
J U V u d
= =
=
                      
(1) 
where U = (uik)i×n is the membership degree matrix, m is 
the number of clusters, dik = ||xk - vi||, and J(U,V) is the sum 
of the weighted squared distance from the attack activity 
to the cluster center in each alarm event. Additionally, the 
weight of attack activity xk belongs to the m-th power of 
the membership degree of the type i-th attack event. The 
clustering criterion of the algorithm is to calculate U and 
V to make J(U, V) have the minimum value, and indicates 
that related attacks xk have similar attack characteristics 
and belong to the same type of attack. 
2) RECOGNITION OF CYBER ATTACK SEQUENCE 
Based on the aggregate calculation of network attack 
alarm events, two factors must be considered to identify 
the CAS belonging to the same attacker. First, due to noise 
interference and the failure of the attacked component 
itself, false alarms and the phenomenon of underreporting 
are difficult to avoid. Second, the causal relationship 
between the attack sequence and the alarm event usually 
has a certain timeliness and time uncertainty. The CAS 
should be formed within a certain period of time after 
different alarm events, but it is difficult to accurately 
determine a clear time interval. 
This paper proposes a method based on the temporal 
causal Bayesian network to identify CASs of the same 
cyber attack sequence. As presented in Fig. 3, the CAS 
recognition method is a two-layer directed acyclic graph, 
the root node of which represents the alarm event, and the 
leaf node of which represents the cyber attack sequence. It 
can be described by a quadruple G={S,CAS',E,K}, where 
S represents an alarm event node set, CAS' represents a 
fuzzy subset of cyber attack sequences,  E is the edge set 
that the cause event node points to the result event node, 
Eij E indicates that alarm events Si and attack result 
events jCAS have a causal relationship, and K represents 
the set of states that have causality. Any KijK can be the 
state of the side switch. 
The specific steps of the method are as follows. 
 
FIGURE 3. Model of temporal causal Bayesian network cyber attack 
sequence. 
 
Step1: When multiple alarm events s1, s2,...,sk can form the 
same CAS, i.e., when the attack sequence contains 
multiple root nodes, each root node event can 
independently trigger the cyber attack. 
Step2: After performing fuzzy operations on all the 
temporal-causal relationships of the CAS, a fuzzy subset 
of the cyber attack sequence CAS' = [s
CE1 
1 > s
CE2 
 2 > …> s
CEm 
m ] 
can be obtained, in which different permutations of alarm 
events constitute different fuzzy subsets CAS'. 
Step3: The fuzzy subset of the CAS contains all possible 
combinations of the alarm events forming the attack 
sequence. As shown in the example in Fig. 3, there are 
three kinds of CASs that may attack the sequence set: 
CAS' = {CAS'1, CAS'2, CAS'3}, where CAS'1 = (s
- 
1 , s
+ 
2 ), 
CAS'2 = (s
+ 
1 , s
- 
2), and CAS'3 = (s
- 
1, s
- 
2). 
Step4: Probability calculations are used to determine 
which attack sequence CAS'i has the greatest credibility. 
For any attack sequence CAS'iCAS', its credibility is 
calculated as follows. 
j
: :
( ) ( , ) (1 )   
+ −= =
  
 = − 
  
  
i i i i
i i
j i s s i s s
Bel CAS max CAS S K  (2)
 Where   is the normalization constant, and πi is the si 
prior probability of occurrence. The maximum value of 
Bel (CAS'j) indicates the alarm event combination [s
CEi1 
1 , s
CEi2 
2 ,...,s
CEim 
m ], which is an accurate sequence of actual CASj. 
C. PAE RECOGNITION BASED ON COMBINED 
CRITERIA 
1) PHYSICAL FEATURE CRITERIA CONDITIONS 
The measurement data of the physical power grid contains 
many attributes, including the voltage, current, phase 
angle, positive sequence, negative sequence, and zero 
sequence. Via analysis, it is found that under different 
types of attacks, there are obvious differences in the 
characteristic curves of these measurement data. The 
features can be summarized as follows. 
Attack type 1: Data injection attack. The measured 
value is maliciously modified to disguise a normal fault, 
causing the operator to mistakenly believe that a short-
circuit fault occurred and to issue a removal instruction. 
Fig. 4 presents a recording of the time interval from 42 to 
92, in which malicious data tampering was performed, 
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resulting in the phase differences between A-C three-phase 
voltages not being 120 degrees. 
 
FIGURE 4. Characteristic curve of voltage phase angle. 
 
Attack type 2: Command injection attack of remote 
switch. An attacker sends a malicious operation command 
to the relay, causing the circuit breaker position to change. 
Fig. 5 presents the positive-negative-zero sequence 
current amplitude changes in the relay after the attacker 
injected a malicious disconnect command in the time 
intervals from 36 to 38 and from 153 to 158. 
 
FIGURE 5. Characteristic curve of positive-negative-zero sequence. 
 
Attack type 3: Relay setting parameter tampering attack. 
The impedance relay main function is to measure the 
distance from the short-circuit point to the protection 
installation. In the attack state, because the protection 
distance parameter is tampered with, the protection has no 
effect. Fig. 6 displays the attacker tampering with relay 
protection parameters in the time intervals from 25 to 60, 
and presents the change in impedance angle ZH between 
the attack failure and the normal failure. 
 
FIGURE 6. Characteristic curve of the impedance phase angle. 
 
Based on the analyses of the characteristic curves of 
these three types of attack states, the physical feature 
criteria for establishing abnormal conditions according to 
the operating characteristics of the physical power grid are 
listed in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Physical feature criteria for abnormal conditions. 
Abnormal 
number 
Physical feature criteria 
Abnormal 
feature 1 
1
2
3
[ , ], ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
0 0 A B B C
A B B C
A B B C
t t t T t t t t
or U t U t U t U t
or I t I t I t I t
    


  + − − − 
− − − 
− − − 
 
Abnormal 
feature 2 0 0
[ , ], ( ) 0 ( ) 00t t t T I t or I t−  +  
 
Abnormal 
feature 3 0 0 4
( )- ( )
[ , ],
( )
1 0
1
z t z t
t t t T z
z t
  + =   
 
In  Table 1, φ(t), U(t), I(t), and z(t) respectively 
represent the phase angle, voltage amplitude, current 
amplitude, and impedance amplitude measured at time t,  
I_(t) and I0(t) respectively represent negative and zero 
sequence currents, Δz represents the rate of change of 
impedance, and ε1, ε2, ε3, and ε4 denote the allowable error 
ranges [29]. 
2) RECOGNITION OF PHYSICAL ATTACK EVENTS 
To accurately identify the specific attack type of the 
abnormal state, three key indicators are defined according 
to the change laws of the measurement characteristics 
under the attack. 
Indicator 1: Phase difference change rate of voltage or 
current. Taking a fixed interval window n, to reflect the 
average deviation of the three-phase current or voltage. 
C
1
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )
n
A B B
u u u u
t
U
t t t t
n
   
 =
− − −
=

        (3) 
C
1
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )
n
A B B
i i i i
t
I
t t t t
n
   
 =
− − −
=

        (4) 
Indicator 2: The amplitude fluctuation rate of voltage 
or current reflects the fluctuation degree of the three-phase 
current or voltage at a certain moment. 
max( )
3 100%
3
A B C
A B C
I
A B C
I I I
I
I I I

 
+ +
−
= 
+ +
       (5) 
max( )
3 100%
3
A B C
A B C
U
A B C
U U U
U
U U U

 
+ +
−
= 
+ +
    (6) 
Indicator 3: The mutation coefficient of the 
negative/zero sequence. When the system fails or attacks, 
it usually breaks down the current negative and zero 
sequence amplitude. Therefore, detecting these two 
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variables that should not occur in the normal state can be 
used as a basis for judging whether the system is abnormal. 
Setting the window length t ,If I0(t) or I-(t) have a 
change in the adjacent t  interval is more than 20% [30], 
it may be considered as an abnormal value. 
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 ( ) ( ) 0.2
( )= ( ) ( ) 0.2
0 ( ) ( ) 0.2
or or or
or or or
or or or
I t I t t I t t and
t I t t I t I t
I t t I t I t

− − −
− − −
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The above three indicators are merged, a physical attack 
event recognition algorithm based on RF, called PAR-RF, 
is proposed to realize the classification detection of 
abnormal measurement data. The main steps of the 
algorithm are as follows. 
Step1: The original physical grid measurement dataset W 
is obtained according to the established physical feature 
criteria condition table to perform a preliminary 
determination of the normal state and the attack state. 
Additionally, a candidate attack dataset that may have 
attack events W' is generated. 
Step2: Supposing that W' contains m samples and each 
sample has X features, a random forest containing T decision 
trees must be trained, Bootstrap is used for sampling, and T 
training sets K of size n (n < m) are obtained from W'. 
Step3: In each training set K, the phase change rates of 
voltage and current ηU and ηI, the amplitude fluctuation rates 
of voltage and current δI and δU, and the mutation coefficient 
of the negative/zero sequence are calculated. Additionally, 
the feature extraction method is used to select important 
features x' according to the feature importance value (x' < X), 
and combined with the three key indicators, namely (x', ηU, ηI, 
δI, δU, τ). 
Step4: CART is used to build a classification decision tree, 
and steps 2 and 3 are repeated to build T decision trees, i.e., 
T classifiers. Rules are then generated to determine the type 
of attack. Finally, the voting results of the T classifiers are 
used to determine the final attack PAE event category e
 
i. 
D. AP EXTRACTION BASED ON TEMPORAL-
TOPOLOGICAL CORRELATION 
Based on the captured CAS and PAE, the temporal and 
topological relationships between the physical and cyber 
components are used as correlated conditions. The frequent 
pattern tree (FP-Tree) is improved via the time scale and 
topology, and a coordinated network attack sequential 
pattern mining algorithm (NSPMA) is proposed. By 
establishing a topology frequent pattern tree (TFP-Tree), 
the coordinated AP of the electric power CPS network is 
mined. The steps of the NSPMA method are as follows. 
Step1: Cyber-physical attack sequential connection based on 
topology. According to the topological relationship O < CEs, 
PEs, R >, the CAS set {CAS1, CAS2,…,CASm} and the PAE 
set {PAE1, PAE2,…,PAEn} are traversed, and if there is a 
connection relationship, operation CASi∪PAEj is performed. 
Step2: The complete attack sequence for each attacker is 
obtained based on a new dynamic time window. The cyber-
physical attack sequence is sorted according to the attacker’s 
AID as the primary key and the timestamp as the secondary 
key. To avoid dividing the sequence of the same attacker into 
different sequences, the dynamic time window winterval in the 
attack scene is designed. The attack sequence is then 
segmented to obtain the complete attack sequence database 
(AD) for all attackers. 
For CASi (which occurs at [ti, ti+n]) and PAEj (which occurs 
at [tj, tj+n]), the attack interval is Δt = |tj—ti+n|. In the relevant 
literature [31], when t  > 240 seconds, after the attack step 
interval exceeds 240 seconds, the attack result will be invalid, 
even without any threat. The maximum upper limit of winterval 
is set to 240 seconds. When t < 240 seconds, winterval is 
dynamically calculated and determined according to the 
average time interval of each type of attack sequence. 
1
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 where tk represents a time interval in which a certain type of 
attack sequence CASi => PAEj may occur among different 
attackers, and ni represents a cumulative number of 
occurrences of the CASi => PAEj sequence in each tk 
interval. 
Step3: Construct attack sequence TFP-Tree. By setting the 
threshold   for attack pattern support, the AD is scanned to 
count each of the attack items, and the CE or PE component 
number is recorded simultaneously. Only the frequent attack 
items greater than   are retained, and the support items are 
sorted in descending order. Then, by scanning the attack 
sequence of each attacker in the AD, the sorted frequent 
items in each attack sequence are obtained, and the attack 
sequence TFP-Tree is established, as shown in Fig. 7. 
 
1 2 1n iNumber of attackers on [S >S ...S =>e ] 
Total number of attackers
 −=     (9) 
Step4: The TFP-Tree is mined to find extremely frequent 
sequences and generate APs. Each item in the header of 
table is traversed in turn, all existing attack paths are 
extracted according to the node list, and the subschema 
base is calculated to build a conditional FP tree. Finally, all 
APs are obtained according to the set attack sequence mode 
confidence   threshold. 
 
1 2 1
1 2 1
[ ... ]
[ ... ]
n i
n
Number of attacks on antecedent S S S consequent e
Number of antecedent attacks S S S
 −
−
 
=

(10) 
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FIGURE 7. TFP-Tree example. 
IV. EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The testbed of Mississippi State University was utilized to 
analyze and verify the proposed method of coordinated 
network attack pattern extraction [32]. The experimental 
connection topology is illustrated in Fig. 8. The physical 
grid system contains the following components: 2 power 
generators G1 and G2, 4 intelligent electronic devices (IED) 
R1 through R4, they can switch the breakers on or off. 4 
circuit breakers BR1 to BR4. R1 controls BR1, R2 controls 
BR2 and son on accordingly. 2 grid lines L1 and L2; the 
components are numbered from PE1 to PE12. The cyber 
system contains the following components: a router, switch, 
snort, syslog server, open PDC, computer terminal, 
software system, etc. The components are numbered from 
CE1 to CE9. 
 
FIGURE 8. Testbed topology. 
A. VALIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF CAS 
RECOGNITION 
A total of 28,901 alarm data was generated in the deployed 
snort, syslog servers, routers, and switches. A fuzzy C-
means clustering algorithm that takes into account cyber 
attack characteristics was verified to aggregate network 
attack events. In the experiment, the attackers were divided 
by IP address. Membership degree was calculated based on 
the continuous variables such as timestamp, and sig_name, 
and the alarm events to which attack activities belong were 
determined by the values. There were 12,360 alarm events 
after calculation, and the results are presented in Fig. 9, 
which displays the changes in the numbers of the top 8 
cyber alarm events before and after aggregation.  
 
FIGURE 9. Comparison of the numbers of original alarms and 
aggregated alarms. 
 
The events were numbered from s1 to s8, and the specific 
event information is presented in Table 2. 
TABLE 2. Meanings of some cyber alarm events. 
Serial 
number 
Attack type Description 
s1 
sshd buffer 
overflow 
Remotely obtain root permissions on 
the target host. 
s2 ftp_rhosts Gain the trust of the target host. 
s3 rsh login 
Get user permissions on the target 
host. 
s4 
local buffer 
overflow 
Get root privileges on localhost. 
s5 sadmind_ping 
Search for active hosts to target 
attacks. 
s6 RDP Inception 
Wait for the intranet administrator to 
initiate an RDP connection request and 
repeatedly obtain the management 
control shell of all devices. 
s7 Rookit 
Install on the target component and 
hide to realize the functions of hiding 
and manipulating and collecting data. 
s8 Landmodule 
Send spoofed data packets to disable 
target devices without corresponding 
protection mechanisms. 
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Based on this clustering data, a temporal causal Bayesian 
network model was used to identify the attack sequences 
belonging to the same attacker, and a total of 420 cyber 
attack sequences was obtained. Based on the maximum 
confidence probability calculation, a total of 138 actual 
attack activity sequences was identified. Due to space 
limitations, only the top 10 cyber attack sequences with 
high credibility are listed, as presented in Table 3.
 
TABLE  3. Top 10 cyber attack sequences with high credibility. 
Serial number Cyber attack sequence set Reliability 
CAS1 s
CE1 
5 > s
CE3 
6 > s
CE2 
1  98.4% 
CAS2 s
CE1 
7 > s
CE3 
5 > s
CE2 
4  97.6% 
CAS3 s
CE7 
7 > s
CE4 
2 > s
CE3 
4  85.4% 
CAS4 s
CE5 
6 > s
CE4 
3 > s
CE3 
4  94.3% 
CAS5 s
CE7 
5 > s
CE4 
7 > s
CE3 
3  91.8% 
CAS6 s
CE8 
8 > s
CE7 
7 > s
CE4 
2 > s
CE3 
4  82.5% 
CAS7 s
CE1 
6 > s
CE6 
8 > s
CE4 
2 > s4 81.7% 
CAS8 s
CE5 
7 > s
CE4 
5 > s
CE3 
8 > s
CE2 
4  80.6% 
CAS9 s
CE1 
6 > s
CE4 
5 > s
CE6 
8 > s
CE5 
2 > s
CE3 
4  77.1% 
CAS10 s
CE6 
8 > s
CE7 
5 > s
CE4 
6 > s
CE3 
2 > s
CE2 
4  76.6% 
 
As is evident from Table 3, the maximum credibility of a 
3-step attack was 98.4%, the maximum credibility of a 4-
step attack was 82.5%, and the maximum credibility of a 5-
step attack was 77.1%. As the length of the identified cyber 
attack sequence increased, the credibility decreased 
significantly. This is because when the length of the attack 
sequence increases, the attacker's intention to attack is 
uncertain. Various tentative attacks will affect the accuracy 
of the identification rate. 
The cyber attack sequence recognition method proposed 
in this paper and other methods proposed in previous 
research [33] are aimed at the mining of network alarm logs 
of multi-step cyber attack sequences. Thus, to further verify 
the effectiveness of the method proposed in this paper, an 
experimental comparison with related methods was carried 
out. The aggregated 12,360 alarm event data were used in 
the experiment, and were divided into 10 groups of test data 
sets. The experimental results are presented in Fig. 10. 
The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed 
method exhibited obvious advantages in both the number of 
recognized attack sequences and the accuracy of 
recognition. This is because the proposed method 
establishes an optimization objective function to determine 
the membership of each sample point to all class centers, 
thereby effectively reducing the number of redundant types 
of alarm information and making up for the shortcomings 
of the other algorithms, which only cluster by the time 
attribute or attack type. It is therefore more in line with the 
actual situation of multi-step attack implementation. On the 
contrary, the intelligent planning method pre-defines the 
prerequisites and consequences of the attack steps, and the 
alarm correlation method uses the time window to segment 
the alarm sequence in sections, the randomness and 
uncertainty of the attack sequence events are ignored. 
 
 
(a) Number of recognized attack sequences 
 
 
(b) Recognition accuracy 
FIGURE 10. Performance comparison of the proposed method, 
intelligent planning method, and alarm correlation method. 
B. VALIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF PAE RECOGNITION 
The physical grid data set was collected by 4 PMUs, and 
includes 28 types of attack scenarios and 9 types of normal, 
short-circuit, and maintenance scenarios. The numbers and 
event descriptions of all 37 scenarios are listed in Table 4.  
TABLE 4. Physical attack event descriptions. 
Event number Description 
e41 Normal 
e1-e6 
short-circuit fault from 10-19%, 20-79%, 80-
90% on L1 or L2 
e13, e14 Line1 or Line2 maintenance 
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e15-e20 remote command injection attack on R1 to R4 
e21-e30, e35-e40 
relay setting change attack from 10-19%, 20-
90%, 10-49%, 50-79% on R1 to R4 
e7-e12 
measuring data injection attacks from 10-19%, 
20-79%, 80-90% on L1 or L2 
 
The data set contains 128 features with a total of about 
70,000 pieces of data, and is divided into 15 sub-data sets. 
The features are explained in the Table 5. There are 29 
types of measurements from each PMU, so the 4 PMUs 
have 116 measurement columns. There are 12 columns for 
control panel logs, snort alerts and relay logs. The last 
column is the marker. 
TABLE 5. Data set features descriptions. 
Feature Description 
PA1:VH – PA3:VH Phase A - C Voltage Phase Angle 
PM1: V – PM3: V Phase A - C Voltage Phase Magnitude 
PA4:IH – PA6:IH Phase A - C Current Phase Angle 
PM4: I – PM6: I Phase A - C Current Phase Magnitude 
PA7:VH – PA9:VH Pos. – Neg. – Zero Voltage Phase Angle 
PM7: V – PM9: V Pos. – Neg. – Zero Voltage Phase Magnitude 
PA10:VH - PA12:VH Pos. – Neg. – Zero Current Phase Angle 
PM10: V - PM12: V Pos. – Neg. – Zero Current Phase Magnitude 
F Frequency for relays 
DF Frequency Delta (dF/dt) for relays 
PA:Z Appearance Impedance for relays 
PA:ZH Appearance Impedance Angle for relays 
S Status Flag for relays 
 
The physical attack event recognition method was 
verified, and an initial random forest with a size of 100 was 
then constructed. The decision rules were generated from 
the training data set, and the top 5 rules for accuracy are 
listed in the Table 6. The index of each rules is in the form 
of “ R#-Signal Reference ”  that indicates a type of 
measurement from a PMU specified by “ R#” . For 
example, R3-PM7:V means Pos voltage phase magnitude 
measured by PMU R3. 
TABLE 6. Top 5 decision rules for accuracy. 
Decision rule 
Most frequent 
category 
Rule accuracy 
(R3-PM7:V <= 130130.2713) and  
(R2-PM6:I <= 383.337036) and 
 (R2-PA3:VH > 48.856111) and 
 (R2-PM5:I <= 486.88949) 
24 0.978 
(R4-PM6:I <= 377.38971) and  
(R1-PM5:I > 357.98005) and 
 (R1-PA6:IH > 49.841599) and 
 (R2-PM5:I <= 510.32757) 
24 0.962 
(R4-PM2:V > 131127.0625) and  
(R2-PM3:V <= 130431.1505) and 
 (R2-PM4:I <= 485.115051) and  
(R4-PA3:VH <= -13.81387799) 
12 0.957 
(R2-PA2:VH <= -156.864385) and 
 (R4-PM5:I > 380.8688) and 
 (R3-PA2:VH <= -34.61811) and 
 (R3-PA5:IH > -125.02512) 
36 0.951 
(R3-PM5:I <= 424.99831) and  
(R2-PA2:VH > -156.864385) and 
 (R2-PM5:I > 362.709045) and 
 (R2-PA3:VH > 48.8561) 
13 0.948 
 
According to the classification rules, the accuracy 
analysis experiment of physical attack type recognition was 
performed. The experiment was performed using PAR-RF 
and the original RF on the test data set. The size of the 
initial random forest scale was 20. To ensure the stability of 
the experimental results, the experiment was repeated 20 
times on each data set. The recognition capabilities of the 
two methods are presented in Fig. 11. 
 
 
FIGURE 11. Comparison of classification accuracy under forests of 
different scales. 
 
The experimental results reveal that PAR-RF exhibited 
better overall classification accuracy than RF due to the 
addition of the key indicators for classification feature 
selection. The best classification accuracy was 97.9%, and 
the forest size was 88. 
Additionally, a test data set was randomly selected from 
15 sample data sets. It contained a total of 5,069 samples, 
of which 4887 test classifications were correct, accounting 
for 96.41%, and 182 were misclassified, accounting for 
3.59%. The classification of 37 scenarios was analyzed via 
the confusion matrix performance, as presented in Fig. 12. 
The main diagonals of the matrix were classified correctly, 
the others were misclassified. 
The accuracy and false positive rates of the 37 attack 
scenarios were calculated according to the confusion matrix, 
as presented in Fig. 13. 
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FIGURE 13. Accuracy and false detection rate of 37 scene recognitions. 
 
The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed 
method has a better recognition effect on single or 
combined relay remote command injection attacks and data 
injection attacks. The top three attack scene recognition 
accuracy rates were e20, e11, and e16; the respective 
recognition accuracy rates were 100%, 99.06%, and 
99.03%, and the respective false detection rates were 0.03%, 
0.02%, and 0.04%. The top three misdetection rates for 
attack scenarios were e1, e7, and e21; the respective 
misdetection rates were 0.11%, 0.09%, and 0.08%, and the 
respective accuracy rates were 95.6%, 92%, and 97.8%. 
The causes of error are analyzed. e1 is a normal short-
circuit fault of Line1 at 10%-19% of the position, and the 
attack events e7 and e21 were tampering via malicious data 
injection or relay R1 parameter settings, resulting in a 
positive sequence of Line1 short-circuit fault at 10%-19%. 
Additionally, the negative/zero sequence amplitude and 
phase angle change were similar, which could easily cause 
confusion in recognition. 
 
 
FIGURE 12. Confusion matrix for the recognition of 37 scenarios. 
 
C. VALIDATION AND ANALYSIS OF ATTACK PATTERN 
EXTRACTION 
CASs and PAEs were recognized based on the reported 
experiments. The NSPMA algorithm was used to mine 
frequent item sets by establishing a TFP-Tree, 
=30 =30 ， ； from which the sequential pattern of the 
coordinated network attack was extracted. 
Via experimental verification, a total of 461 complete 
attack paths were obtained, and 22 frequent attack patterns 
were mined. The results are sorted in descending order 
according to the number of sequences that occur in each 
pattern, as shown in the Fig .14. This proved that frequent 
attack patterns account for only a small percentage. 
 
FIGURE14.  Descending statistics of sequence number in attack 
pattern 
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sequential patterns with a confidence level of greater than 
90% were found, as shown in Table 7. For example, the 
pattern [s
CE4 
5 >s
CE3 
1 =>e
PE2 
21 ] indicates that when the cyber 
component CE4 is attacked by a Sadmind Ping (s
 
5), and 
then CE3 is attacked by an sshd buffer overflow (s
 
1), the 
physical component PE2 suffers a relay setting change  
attack (e
 
21) with a confidence of 93.1%, support of 97.5%. 
TABLE 7. Coordinated network attack pattern with top 6 confidence. 
Serial 
number 
Coordinated network attack 
pattern  
Confidence Support 
1 [s
CE1 
5 >s
CE3 
6 > s
CE2 
3 =>e
PE2 
16 ] 94.1% 98.6% 
2 [s
CE4 
5 >s
CE3 
1 =>e
PE2 
21 ] 93.1% 97.5% 
3 [s
CE7 
7 >s
CE4 
5 > s
CE3 
3 =>e
PE11 
7 ] 92.6% 93.5% 
4 [s
CE6 
6 >s
CE4 
8 > s
CE3 
4 =>e
PE1 
17 ] 91.3% 92.7% 
5 [s
CE4 
6 >s
CE3 
2 =>e
PE9 
27 ] 91.6% 94.6% 
6 [s
CE4 
3 >s
CE3 
4 =>e
PE3 
9 ] 90.5% 95.4% 
 
By summarizing the results of these attack patterns, three 
typical network cooperative attack patterns can be 
determined. 
1) The data injection attack patterns mainly focus on 
network monitoring, packet read and write (such as the 
Netcat tool) attack events, and the injection of maliciously 
tampered-with data to affect the dispatcher's decision, such 
as the following pattern: [s
CE7 
7 >s
CE4 
5 >s
CE3 
3 =>e
PE11 
7 ]. 
2) The command injection attack pattern mainly uses 
password brute force cracking and privilege elevation 
attacks. After gaining the root privileges of the dispatcher, 
malicious load shedding attacks on the physical grid are 
performed, such as the following pattern: [s
CE6 
6 >s
CE4 
8 >s
CE3 
4
=>e
PE1 
17 ]. 
3) The attack pattern of tampering with relay setting 
mainly targets router or switch security vulnerabilities. The 
relay device is invaded through a network connection to 
maliciously modify the protection distance parameter, 
which causes the relay to refuse to operate when a fault 
occurs, such as the following pattern: [s
CE4 
6 >s
CE3 
2 =>e
PE9 
27 ]. 
To fully verify the efficiency of the NSPMA algorithm 
proposed in this paper, four representative sequential 
pattern mining algorithms, namely Prefix Span, Free Span, 
GSP, and Spade, were selected for comparison experiments. 
Under the same conditions, according to the different 
support levels set, each algorithm was independently run 20 
times, and the average running time was taken as the 
calculation result. The time efficiency comparison of the 
four algorithms is presented in Fig. 15. 
 
 
FIGURE 15.  Algorithm running times with different support thresholds. 
 
The results demonstrate that with the increase of the 
support threshold, the running time of each algorithm will 
decrease rapidly. The reason for this is that as the support 
threshold increases, the number of frequent pattern 
sequences that meet the threshold will decrease, and the 
running time will also decrease. In terms of running time, 
NSPMA was found to be superior to the other algorithms. 
This is because the connection topology of components is 
considered in the frequent item set comparison process, i.e., 
item sets that have no relationship will be directly pruned 
without the need for connection operations; this avoid a 
large number of useless candidate sequence item sets, 
thereby effectively improving the efficiency of pattern 
mining. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a new method for the automatic mining 
of attack patterns from measurement data and information 
alarm logs based on the characteristics of coordinated 
network attacks that occur in physical space and cyber 
space, and the temporal and topological correlation between 
each attack step. The proposed method can restore the 
complete attack path of the attacker and identify the key 
cyber and physical components that are vulnerable in the 
electric power CPS network. This method proposes the 
concept of coordinated network attack modes and uses 
corresponding algorithms for physical attack event 
identification, cyber attack sequence identification, and 
multi-step frequent attack mode extraction. 
This paper comprehensively considered the attack 
process of both cyber and physical space. Moreover, the 
proposed method does not rely on various complicated 
association rules that are set manually, and does not require 
a large amount of prior knowledge to achieve good 
practical results. In complex electric power CPS networks, 
the attack patterns discovered in different network 
cooperative attack sequences may be local. Therefore, 
future research will focus on the investigation of attack 
pattern fusion methods in large-scale topologies. 
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